Jammu and Kashmir Industrial Land Allotment Merit List Faces Scrutiny Over Policy Flaws

Srinagar, Apr 13: Serious concerns have been raised regarding the fairness and transparency of the industrial land allotment process in Jammu and Kashmir, following the release of a provisional merit list. Stakeholders allege that inflated projections and inherent flaws within the policy framework have skewed the evaluation, prompting calls for urgent review.

Information was available with The Chenab Times indicating that the Directorate of Industries and Commerce published the provisional merit list on April 9, 2026. This followed a High-Level Land Allotment Committee meeting held on March 18, 2026. The policy, governed by Government Order No 65-IND of 2021, which outlines the J&K Industrial Land Allotment Policy 2021-30, is now under scrutiny for its practical implementation.

Policy Design and Evaluation Concerns

The J&K Industrial Land Allotment Policy 2021-30 was designed with the intention of establishing an objective and transparent system for evaluating applications. It considers nearly 15 parameters, including proposed investment, anticipated employment generation, land utilisation efficiency, pollution category, MSME classification, and various socio-economic factors. Despite the policy’s sound intentions, the application of its criteria, as evidenced by the provisional merit list, has triggered widespread apprehension about its credibility and fairness.

A significant point of contention is the disproportionately high weightage given to two specific parameters: investment per kanal and employment per kanal. These two metrics account for approximately 80 percent of the total score. While seemingly rational in theory, this scoring mechanism has, in practice, created a flawed incentive structure that rewards declarations over demonstrated feasibility.

Inflated Projections and Sectoral Disparities

The provisional merit list reportedly features numerous instances where applicants have submitted extraordinarily high employment figures for very small land parcels. Claims of over 100 employments per kanal, and even micro-units projecting employment levels comparable to medium-scale enterprises, are not isolated incidents but appear to be recurring patterns. Such projections are viewed as defying sectoral realities and exposing a fundamental weakness: the policy inadvertently incentivises the inflation of figures in project reports without rigorous technical validation or appropriate sectoral benchmarking.

This emphasis on self-reported data from Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) without adequate scrutiny places genuine entrepreneurs with realistic projections at a disadvantage, while exaggerated claims gain an artificial advantage. The problem is further exacerbated by the uniform application of evaluation criteria across vastly different industrial sectors. The labour intensity, land requirements, and operational dynamics vary significantly between sectors such as IT services, manufacturing, healthcare, cold storage, and heavy industry.

Applying a single evaluative grid, particularly the “employment per kanal” metric, across such diverse activities leads to distorted comparisons. Fundamentally incomparable activities are being judged by identical standards. Furthermore, the focus on per kanal efficiency disproportionately favours applicants seeking smaller land parcels, potentially at the expense of larger, capital-intensive projects that might offer greater long-term economic value but naturally exhibit lower employment density ratios. This risks privileging short-term numerical advantages over sustainable industrial development.

Accountability and Planning Challenges

An equally significant concern is the absence of a credible mechanism for post-allotment accountability. If inflated projections influence land allotment decisions from the outset, there is little assurance that these commitments will translate into actual investment or employment on the ground. The current system neither penalises overstatement nor adequately rewards the fulfilment of promises, thereby undermining the discipline expected from such a framework.

The provisional merit list is seen as a reflection of structural infirmities in both the design and implementation of the policy. It highlights the urgent need for corrective measures, including independent technical appraisal of DPRs, sector-specific benchmarking, normalization of extreme values, and a phased verification mechanism that links land retention to actual performance. Greater emphasis should also be placed on financial closure, the track record of applicants, and project viability rather than relying solely on notional projections.

Critique of Sector-Specific Development Plans

Beyond the scoring methodology, the concerns extend to the broader planning approach. While the government’s initiative to develop sector-specific industrial estates, such as for IT, ITES, and education at locations like Rakh-e-Gund Aksha (Bemina) and Khunmoh (Phase-IV), reflects a forward-looking vision, the extension of this clustering logic to healthcare, termed a “Medicity,” raises questions about viability and public utility.

Healthcare, unlike IT or education, is inherently demand-driven and sensitive to location. Concentrating hospitals, diagnostic centres, and medical institutions in limited areas like Bemina and Lelhar risks fostering unhealthy competition, underutilisation of infrastructure, and duplication of services. More critically, it may lead to inequitable access for significant portions of the population. In a region where geography and connectivity already present challenges, such centralization could undermine the objective of improving healthcare access. Public policy in sectors like healthcare must prioritise spatial distribution over administrative convenience to ensure better service delivery and sustainable demand across regions.

The ease of doing business is contingent upon procedural transparency, credibility, and trust in institutional processes. When policies incentivise exaggeration and fail to distinguish between intent and capability, this trust risks erosion. The window for objections to the provisional merit list thus presents an opportunity to correct systemic distortions and restore integrity to the land allotment framework. Without such corrections, the policy may become an example where well-intentioned design is undermined by flawed execution, diminishing both industry and governance.

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